The Value of Coverage in the Medicare Advantage Insurance Market by Abe Dunn




This paper examines the impact of coverage on demand for health insurance in the Medicare Advantage
(MA) insurance market. Estimating the e⁄ects of coverage on demand poses a challenge for researchers who
must must consider both the hundreds of bene￿ts that a⁄ect out-of-pocket costs (OOPC) to consumers, but also
the endogeneity of coverage. These problems are addressed in a discrete choice demand model by employing a
unique measure of OOPC that considers a consumer￿ s expected payments for a ￿xed bundle of health services and
applying instrumental variable techniques to address potential endogneity bias. The results of the demand model
show that OOPC have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on consumer surplus and that not instrumenting for OOPC results in
a signi￿cant underestimate of the value of coverage.
1 Introduction
Both the premium and the level of coverage are fundamental components of all health insurance plans. Consumers
pay a ￿xed premium for a plan and, in return, insurers cover a portion of the medical expenses. Coverage is likely
to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on consumer surplus since many consumers purchase health insurance to protect against
unexpected health events. In addition, from a theoretical perspective, it is widely understood that insurers compete
by setting both the premium and insurance bene￿ts.1 However, few empirical studies focus on the e⁄ect of coverage
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1The classic theoretical analysis of insurance competition by Rothchschild and Stiglitz (1976) assumes that insurers choose both the
premium and level of coverage. This assumption is also made in recent papers that explore the e⁄ects of competition in health insurance
markets in alternative settings (e.g. Vaithianathan (2006) and Olivella and Vera-Hernandez (2007)).
1on health insurance demand. This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the e⁄ects of both the premium
and the level of coverage on the demand for health insurance.
Understanding the e⁄ect of coverage is important for several reasons. First, achieving the goal of many poli-
cymakers to provide insurance for the 46 million uninsured in the U.S. is likely to be costly, so it is important to
assess the value of insurance bene￿ts provided to consumers. Second, coverage may a⁄ect the overall cost of medical
care for insurers and consumers by impacting the amount of health services consumed and it may also a⁄ect health
outcomes. In particular, prior research has shown that when coverage is greater individuals consume more health
services and that additional health inputs can lead to improved health outcomes.2 Third, insurers may respond to
competition by adjusting bene￿ts rather than changing premiums. Therefore, measuring the impact of coverage on
demand is an essential step in determining the full e⁄ect of competition on insurer pro￿ts and consumer surplus.
This paper focuses on the demand for Medicare Advantage (MA) insurance products. MA insurance is a private
alternative to parts A and B of traditional Medicare that primarily covers individuals over the age of 65 and enrolls
approximately 20% of the Medicare eligible population. In contrast to traditional Medicare, the MA program allows
private insurers to compete on bene￿ts and price. The level of coverage appears to be important to Medicare
bene￿ciaries, with the Median bene￿ciary over 65 spending nearly 13% of their income on health care in 2003
compared to just 2.2% for the under 65 population. Around 10% of the Medicare eligible population over 65 spends
more than 35% of their income on health care.3 Out-of-pocket cost (OOPC), that includes the cost of deductibles,
copayments, and coinsurance for hospital, physician, and prescription drugs, make up 55% of health care expenditures
paid by Medicare bene￿ciaries.4 While the level of coverage appears to be important for Medicare bene￿ciaries in
general, it seems especially critical for enrollees in MA plans. Atherly and Thorpe (2005) report that the primary
reasons Medicare bene￿ciaries select MA plans include lower costs and greater bene￿ts. In addition, about 20% of
MA enrollees are in zero premium plans, so coverage is a key dimension of competition for many insurers.
Prior studies examining the e⁄ect of coverage face two empirical problems. First, they typically include only
a few plan bene￿ts such as copayments or coinsurance for speci￿c services that may a⁄ect consumer demand.5
2There are many studies that show that show the amount of health services consumed is associated with the level of coverage. Key
evidence is found from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (See Newhouse et al (1993)). Numerous academic studies have shown
links between health care treatments and health outcomes. Although there is evidence that shows that having no insurance is associated
with poorer health (See Weissman and Epstein (1994)), there is less direct evidence linking the level of insurance coverage with improved
health outcomes.
3Desmond et al (2007) calculate these ￿gures using information from the 2003 Current Population Survey.
4AARP Data Digest (2004).
5For instance, Town and Liu (2003) examine the impact of prescription drug insurance on the demand for MA products using an
indicator of whether drug insurance is o⁄ered. Atherly, Feldman and Dowd (2003) examine how a variety of plan characteristics a⁄ect
demand for MA products. Hall (2007) re-examines the value of the prescription drug bene￿ts and a variety of other bene￿ts applying a
similar methodology to Town and Liu. Lustig (2008) explores issues of adverse selection in MA markets including particular drug and
medical service bene￿ts. There is a long list of studies that examine the demand for health insurance in non-medicare sectors that also
introduce bene￿t information in this manner or exclude bene￿t information entirely. Some recent examples include Town (2001) and
2However, there are potentially hundreds of plan bene￿ts that are important to consumers, but may be di¢ cult to
incorporate in a demand framework because of the number of bene￿ts and nonlinearities in bene￿t packages (e.g.
copays, coinsurance, deductibles, OOPC maximums, limits on coverage for speci￿c services among others). Excluding
bene￿t information may understate the impact that an insurer￿ s choice of coverage has on consumer utility and may
also cause omitted variable bias. A second problem is that coverage is a major choice variable of insurers who can
change many bene￿ts as easily as the premium on the plan, so the level of coverage is likely to be endogenous. The
model presented in this paper addresses these two empirical issues.
The e⁄ect of coverage on demand is measured by estimating a di⁄erentiated product demand model for MA
products. The demand model is a nested logit model similar to Berry (1994) where MA plans are included in a nest
and the outside option is traditional Medicare. Consumer utility depends on the premium, the level of coverage,
and other observed and unobserved plan characteristics. The whole range of bene￿ts are captured using a unique
estimate of expected OOPC which is the total amount a typical Medicare eligible individual might expect to pay
in copays, coinsurance, and deductibles, holding the amount of medical services ￿xed across plans. The expected
OOPC is a practical measure of coverage that is made publicly available by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) so that Medicare bene￿ciaries can compare the bene￿ts of various plans. This is the ￿rst paper to
use this comprehensive measure of coverage in a demand analysis. In addition, I treat both the plan premiums and
OOPC as endogenous variables chosen by the insurer and apply instrumental variable techniques as well as ￿xed
e⁄ects to account for any potential bias.
This paper makes two primary contributions to the health insurance demand literature. First, it presents
evidence that not instrumenting for OOPC may produce bias demand estimates that would underestimate the value
of insurance coverage by more than 600%. This result has implications for studies that examine the e⁄ect of health
insurance quality on enrollment decisions. If one views coverage as a measure of quality, the ￿ndings presented here
suggest that not instrumenting for quality may result in an underestimate of the e⁄ect of quality on demand, which
may partially explain why prior studies have found only small increases in the market share of highly rated plans.6
The second contribution is that OOPC have a very large impact on consumer surplus in MA markets. The most
conservative estimates of the value of coverage show that reducing OOPC by 50% would increase consumer surplus
by more than 50%. This is greater than the impact of reducing all MA insurance premiums to zero.
Measuring the e⁄ect of OOPC on demand helps explain why Medicare eligible individuals purchase MA plans,
but policymakers may also be interested in the overall surplus generated by the MA program relative to the cost of
funding the program. This comparison has become increasingly relevant as there has been a substantial increase
in payments to MA insurers relative to the cost of traditional Medicare. While the demand estimates imply that
Abraham, Vogt and Gaynor (2007).
6See Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002), Beaulieu (2002), Chernew, Gowriskankaran and Scanlon (2006), Jin and Sorensen (2006), and Dafny
and Dranove (2008). Unlike several of these papers, my paper does not attempt to distinguish between market based learning about
quality and information based learning from the public reporting of the OOPC measure.
3consumer surplus generated by the MA program is over $21.0 billion in 2007, in that same year MA insurers received
about 12% more for covering similar bene￿ciaries in traditional Medicare resulting in the government paying roughly
$9.2 billion more to MA insurers, resulting in a net surplus of $11.2 billion. Although all types of plans produce net
surplus gains, there is a wide disparity in the payments to di⁄erent plans and the net surplus generated per person
across plans. I ￿nd that consumer surplus per enrollee in Private Fee-For-Service (PFFS) plans is greater than the
surplus generated by Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans, but the additional cost to the government of
funding the PFFS plans causes the net surplus per additional enrollee to be less than half the amount of the less
costly HMO alternatives. The large disparity in net surplus generated per person suggests that policymakers should
explore the opportunity cost of additional funding to the more highly paid plans.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following sections: Section 2 reviews the recent changes in
the Medicare Advantage market; Section 3 presents the data and variables; Section 4 describes the demand model;
Section 5 shows the results; Section 6 presents the policy analysis; and the last section concludes.
2 An Overview of Changes in the Medicare Advantage Market
Since the early 1970s Medicare bene￿ciaries have had the option of enrolling in private managed care insurance. The
program, now called Medicare Advantage, provides Medicare eligible individuals the option to forgo the traditional
fee-for-service Medicare plan and enroll in privately administered managed care alternatives. These private plans
cover Medicare (Parts A and B) for a payment made from CMS. The MA program provides consumers with a greater
variety of choices and allows private insurers to compete in o⁄ering insurance bene￿ts to Medicare bene￿ciaries that
are often greater than what is covered under traditional Medicare.
Medicare primarily covers individuals over the age of 65, but it also covers disabled individuals and those with
end-stage renal disease. In counties where MA plans are o⁄ered, Medicare bene￿ciaries may either choose to enroll
in an MA plan or remain in traditional Medicare. A vast majority of Medicare bene￿ciaries remain in traditional
Medicare. All Medicare bene￿ciaries are automatically enrolled in Part A of the program which covers hospital care.
Most bene￿ciaries also pay an additional premium to enroll in medicare Part B which covers physician services and
outpatient services with a 20% coinsurance as well as some mental health coverage and lab and diagnostic testing.
MA plans are regulated at the county level. Regulators require that the MA insurers provide the same level of
bene￿ts as traditional Medicare and ensure that pro￿ts on the MA business do not exceed pro￿ts on the companies
commercial insurance business. Payments from CMS to MA insurers vary by county and across years. Bene￿ciaries
that wish to enroll in an MA plan are required to also enroll in part B of the plan and pay the part B monthly
premium (in 2007 the premium was $93.50).
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) changed many aspects
of the MA program. The MMA created the prescription drug program (Part D), renamed the program "Medicare
4Advantage",7 introduced the Regional Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans that were ￿rst o⁄ered in 2006,8
and introduced a bidding system for MA insurers.9 However, one of the key changes that had an immediate impact
on MA markets was a 10.9% increase in rates paid to MA insurers in 2004.10 Figure 1 shows the average MA rates
across counties and changes in enrollment over the 2001 to 2007 time period.11 The goal of the increase in rates was
to encourage participation, which appears to have been successful with a substantial increase in enrollment, from
around 5 million enrollees in 2003 to over 8 million in 2007.
FIGURE 1. ENROLLMENT BY PLAN TYPE 2001-07
In addition to an expansion in enrollment after 2003, there has also been an expansion in the number and type
of plans o⁄ered. In 2003 bene￿ciaries were primarily enrolled in MA Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
plans, but after 2003 PPO and PFFS plans became more prevalent. There is no sharp distinction between PPO
and HMO plans, but the HMO products tend to o⁄er smaller and more restrictive networks where there are limited
out-of-network bene￿ts. It is also common for HMO plans to require enrollees to obtain a referral from a primary
care physician or gatekeeper to see a specialist. The PFFS plans are distinct from the network based HMO and
PPO plans because they do not have a network of providers.12 In 2003 few people were enrolled in PFFS or PPO
plans, but by 2007 about 1.5 million individuals were enrolled in PFFS plans and over 500,000 were enrolled in PPO
plans.
The large increase in MA rates accomplished the goal of substantially expanding MA participation, but it has also
spurred controversy. The rate increase has resulted in considerably higher cost to the government. The Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPac), which advises congress on issues a⁄ecting the Medicare program, estimated
that in 2006 it costs Medicare 12% more to cover individuals in the MA program relative to those in traditional
Medicare.13 Similarly high rates were also reported in 2008 and 2009. In contrast, in 2003 the rates were much
7The program was previously called "Medicare + Choice".
8Regional PPO plans require insurers to o⁄er insurance across a large geographic area, and were introduced to promote penetration
of MA plans across a broader area. In 2007 Regional PPOs made up less than 3% of overall enrollment.
9Prior to 2006 Medicare reimbursed participating HMOs a ￿xed amount per enrollee. In 2006 the payments incorporated a bidding
mechanism that allows MA insurers to bid against a county benchmark. Insurers submit bids for o⁄ering bene￿ts that cover part A and
B of traditional Medicare. If the bid is above the benchmark the enrollees must pay for the additional cost in the form of an additional
premium. If the plan￿ s bid is below the benchmark, 75% of the di⁄erence, is provided to enrollees in the form of cost-sharing. The
remaining 25% of that di⁄erence is retained by the government. Although the system has added greater ￿exibility in how rates are
paid to insurers, it is not clear whether this change has impacted competition among insurers. Even for a ￿xed fee, ￿rms have always
had the incentive to compete in MA markets to attract enrollees by o⁄ering greater bene￿ts than rivals. What has changed is that the
governments costs are reduced when insurers bid more aggressively.
10Kaiser Family Foundation, (2004), Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet
11The HMO category also includes Cost Plus and Demonstration Medicare plans.
12Although the PFFS plans and traditional Medicare do not have a network, bene￿ciaries in these plans are restricted to those doctors
that are willing to accept payments from these plans. The Center for Studying Health System for Change found that in the 2004-05
period only about 73% of doctors accept all Medicare patients. In contrast, network based MA products are able to customize a physician
network that may include doctors not available under PFFS plans or traditional Medicare.
13See Update on Medicare Private Plans, Chapter 4 (2007) Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy. For 2006 and
5closer to the cost of covering those in traditional Medicare at only about 3% more on average. MedPac views these
expenditures as costly and has advised congress to pay insurers the same amount for enrollees in the MA program
as it cost to insure similar individuals in traditional Medicare. However, some have argued that the additional
payments may be justi￿ed because they lead to additional bene￿ts provided by MA insurers. This study contributes
to this debate by comparing the surplus gains from the increased payments to the additional cost to the government.
3 Data and Variables
There are three primary data sets used in this study: OOPC data produced from the out-of-pocket cost calculator,
plan characteristics from the plan compare database, and enrollment data from the State-County-Plan (SCP) ￿les.
The OOPC data includes an estimate of the amount an enrollee might expect to pay out-of-pocket for a month
for choosing a speci￿c plan. The data is available to the public through the CMS website and provides a method
of comparing the relative amounts of coverage for various plans.14 The expected out-of-pocket estimate is useful
to Medicare bene￿ciaries because plans often have a multitude of bene￿ts, so this ￿gure is a useful indicator of the
overall level of coverage. The reported estimate is speci￿c to an individual￿ s age and health condition. For instance,
in 2004 the expected OOPC for a man aged 73 that self-reports his health status as poor and selects the insurance
plan in Las Vegas, Nevada called ￿Spectrum HMO￿has an estimated monthly out-of-pocket cost of $529.
The OOPC estimates are constructed by using a sample of more than 10,000 individuals from the Medicare
Current Bene￿ciaries Survey (MCBS).15 Using information on medical services used by individuals in the survey,
CMS calculates how much each individual would pay out-of-pocket for each plan, holding the health services used
constant for each individual in the sample. By ￿xing health care consumption for each individual, the contribution
of each service to the expected OOPC is weighed in proportion to the amount Medicare bene￿ciaries actually use
each service. In addition, ￿xing health care consumption allows for a fair comparison of OOPC across plans. The
health services covered in the calculation include those services covered by traditional Medicare, but it also considers
services not covered by traditional Medicare, such as, drugs, vision and dental. In fact, in calculating the OOPC
estimate nearly all health services used by bene￿ciaries are included in the analysis such as the cost of specialists,
inpatient hospital visits, outpatient hospital visits, prosthetics and orthotics, renal dialysis, primary care physician
visits, and numerous other services.16 The wide range of services covered by the OOPC variable makes it a useful
2008 MedPac states that their calculation corrects for both demographic di⁄erences and di⁄erences in health risk when considering the
hypothetical cost of MA enrollees in traditional Medicare. In 2003, the cost di⁄erences are adjusted for demographic di⁄erences, but
they are not adjusted for health risk.
14The information is available publicly through the plan compare website so users can look up OOPC values for particular plans
(http://www.medicare.gov/MPPF/Include/DataSection/Questions/SearchOptions.asp). However, this paper uses the full database of
all OOPC calculations from CMS, which is not available publicly at this time.
15The MCBS is a survey of Medicare bene￿ciaries. The data is available to the public and contains information that links the survey
and Medicare administrative bill records. According to CMS, the ￿nal cohort chosen each year is su¢ cient to be nationally representative.
16It also includes surgical supplies, emergency room visits, ambulance services, mammography screening, urgent care, pap smears,
6and meaningful index of the level of coverage.
There are a number of key assumptions CMS makes in constructing the OOPC estimate. First, where applicable,
it is assumed that an enrollee receives in-network services. Therefore, the OOPC measure should be viewed as the
cost of in-network services. Second, in cases where coinsurance is used for medical services, the amount paid by
the enrollee is calculated based on the observed expenditure in the MCBS survey. For instance, if a plan has 80%
coinsurance for doctors visits and total expenditures on visits are observed to be $600, then the OOPC for doctors
services is assumed to be (100%￿80%)￿($600) = $120. Third, in plans with a minimum and maximum cost share,
the minimum cost share amount is used.17 Fourth, while the goal of predicting the amount spent on OOPC remained
the same over the sample period, the methodology used to calculate OOPC for prescription drugs changed in 2007.
Prior to 2007 CMS reported all drug expenditures, but in 2007 they report only drug expenditures on identi￿able
prescription drugs. This change causes a shift in the reported level of OOPC drug expenses for non-covered drugs
for bene￿ciaries with and without drug insurance, but has a relatively limited impact on the calculation of OOPC
savings relative to having no insurance. Therefore, I will focus on the OOPC savings. Fifth, the sample from the
MCBS survey includes individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare and excludes individuals enrolled in MA plans
because of insu¢ cient data. Therefore, the OOPC measure should be interpreted as a measure of the relative
cost of a typical basket of health services, rather than a precise measure of OOPC for those enrolled in MA plans.
Additional assumptions used to construct the estimates are available from CMS.18
The rules used to calculate the OOPC estimate are consistently applied across plans. One limitation of the
OOPC measurement is that di⁄erent cohorts are chosen from the MCBS ￿le in di⁄erent years. For instance, for
the 2007 OOPC data the MCBS cohort was from 2001 to 2002, but for the 2004 OOPC data CMS uses the 1999
to 2000 MCBS ￿les. Since every cohort uses a unique set of medical services, the measure of OOPC will change
slightly across years in the sample. In other words, the OOPC measurement more precisely identi￿es the relative
cost of plans within a year, rather than the change in the OOPC of a plan across years. This will have implications
for the speci￿cation of the model discussed later in the paper.
The OOPC data available from the website reports the total OOPC for selecting a particular plan. However,
I obtained a more detailed version of the OOPC data that distinguishes between OOPC for di⁄erent services, such
as prescription drugs or other medical services. In analyzing the e⁄ects of OOPC on demand, I view the drug
coverage as distinct from other medical services for several reasons. First, historically traditional Medicare has not
provided drug coverage, so consumers may view the choice of drug coverage as distinct. Second, for prescription
physical therapy, occupational therapy, immunizations, cardiac rehabilitation, theraputic radiation, mental health, diagnostic/lab tests,
x-ray and MRIs, hearing exams, substance abuse, inpatient hospital services, inpatient psychiatric services, skilled nursing, psychiatry,
chiropractic services, podiatry, eye exams, hearing, dental, and eye wear.
17This is true, with the exception of selected high cost X-ray services (CT, MRI, EKG, PET, and EER). For the high cost services
the maximum cost share amount was used.
18See "CY 2007 Medicare Options Compare Cohort Selection and Out-of-Pocket Cost Estiamtes Methodology".
7drugs enrollees can switch to cheaper, generic alternatives or use pill-splitting to save money, so separating out the
OOPC expenditures for prescription drugs considers that bene￿ciaries may be able to shift drug expenditures more
easily than other medical expenses. Third, drug purchases are more likely to involve stable payments relative to
other medical services, so insurance coverage for prescription drugs may be less valuable than insurance coverage for
services that are costly and involve greater uncertainty. For example, estimates from the 2006 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey report that around 91% of individuals over the age of 65 used prescription drugs and for those with
expenditures the mean total expenditure (spending by the insurer plus OOPC) was $2,108.19 In contrast, for
inpatient hospital services only 18% of individuals over 65 used inpatient services, but for those that used services
the expenditures are high with a mean total expenditure of $18,061. Risk averse enrollees may value medical
insurance that covers costly catastrophic events di⁄erently than coverage for prescription drugs that tends to have
more stable and predictable payments.
Aggregate OOPC estimates for medical services and prescription drugs are constructed by averaging across age
and health status categories. For each of these two categories, a single measure of OOPC is estimated by taking a
weighted average of the number of individuals in each age and health status category observed in the MCBS ￿le. To
correct for the change in methodology in 2007, I normalize the OOPC amount for prescription drugs so that policies
with no coverage report OOPC estimates of zero. I do this by subtracting the OOPC for prescription drugs for plans
with no drug insurance in that same year. For example, if policy A has drug coverage and a reported OOPC for
prescription drugs of $100 and policies with no drug coverage in that year report OOPC of $230, then the reported
OOPC amount for policy A is -$130 (=100-230). Therefore, the OOPC for prescription drugs variable is a negative
value representing the amount of money saved for an enrollee in that plan relative to the expenditure if the enrollee
did not have drug insurance. If a plan does not have drug insurance, then the predicted OOPC for prescription
drugs is normalized to $0. This adjustment accounts for the fact that the amount of non-covered drug services for
both insured and uninsured individuals shift over time.
Information about plan bene￿ts is obtained from the Medicare Plan Compare database, which provides informa-
tion on bene￿t packages for each plan.20 Bene￿t information extracted from this database include: the premium,
the deductible, the out-of-pocket cost limit (i.e. the maximum an enrollee pays out-of-pocket), an indicator for drug
insurance, whether the plan requires a referral to see a specialist, and the size of the physician network. Bene￿ciaries
value the size or breadth of the physician network because they must commit to a provider network at the time of
purchasing insurance and a broader network reduces the probability of needing more expensive out-of-network ser-
vices in the event of an illness.21 The referral indicates the restrictiveness of the network. In addition to including
the referral variable, the physician network size and the referral variable are interacted to capture the e⁄ect of the
19www.meps.ahr.gov
20The information about each plan is available to the public through the medicare options compare website
(http://www.medicare.gov/MPPF).
21Dranove and White (1996) refer to these markets as "option demand markets".
8referral requirement on the value of the network. Requiring a referral increases the time cost of accessing services on
a provider network, so one might expect that requiring a referral would reduce the value of the number of physicians
in the network.
The SCP data contains enrollment information by insurer and contract for October of each year.22 Unfortunately
there may be multiple "plans" contained under the same "contract". For instance, there may be two plans that have
di⁄erent bene￿ts and di⁄erent premiums that have the same contract number, so I cannot determine the number of
individuals enrolled in each plan. Although many of the characteristics are often the same (e.g. whether the plan is
an HMO or PPO and the network size are determined at the contract level); other characteristics are not the same
(e.g. the premium and OOPC estimates). To address this issue, I take a similar approach to others in the literature
and aggregate plan information to the contract level.23 To match market shares for a contract to plan characteristics,
the plan characteristics are averaged across plans that are listed under the same contract.24 In addition to using
enrollment information, the SCP data also contains information on the number of eligible individuals in each county
in each year. A variable indicating the number of plan o⁄erings under the same contract is also constructed, which
is an ad hoc variable that accounts for the increased utility from additional plan o⁄erings that arises from consumer￿ s
heterogenous taste.25
The appendix contains additional details about data used in this study including the age of the contract in a
county, the age of the insurer, and other bene￿t characteristics. Table A1 in the appendix lists the variables used
in this study along with a brief description.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for each contract-county observation across all years. The ￿rst ￿ve rows of
the table shows the main variables of interest including the OOPC variables, the premium, and the network size.
Recall that the expected OOPC variable for prescription drugs is a negative value, indicating how much one saves
in OOPC relative to not having insurance. A more negative value of the OOPC for prescription drugs variable
indicates greater coverage. The combined total of OOPC for medical services and the absolute value of OOPC for
prescription drugs is greater than the premium, suggesting that OOPC variables may be economically important to
bene￿ciaries. The table also shows that there is not a ￿xed package of bene￿ts, but rather a considerable variation
22October is one month prior to the open enrollment for the following year. October is chosen because it is after all Open Enrollment
periods in which consumers may switch plans (lasting from November 15th to March 31st) and enrollment in October is observed for
every year of the data.
23An insurer may have more than one contract in a single market. (E.g. An HMO and a PFFS contract).
24While prior work has selected the plan with the lowest premium (See Town and Liu (2003) and Dafny and Dranove (2008)), arguing
that consumers would tend to choose the plan with the lowest premium. I view consumers valuing numerous characteristics, with the
premium being just one among many. Therefore, I simply average the plan characteristics and premiums. Results do not change
signi￿cantly if the plan with the minimum premium is used instead of averaging across product characteristics.
25Inclusion of the plan variety variable reduces potential bias that might arise if plan variety is attributed to other product characteristics.
9in the OOPC, with a standard deviation above $30 for both prescription drugs and medical services. There is also
substantial variation in network size, with the mean network size almost twice the size of the median. The standard
deviation for the premium is large at around $57, but it is important to highlight that about 20% of MA enrollees
are in contracts charging a monthly premium of zero, so other attributes are likely to be the distinguishing feature of
many contracts.26 While there are large di⁄erences in the generosity of bene￿ts across contracts, a demand model
is necessary to determine how changes in these variables actually a⁄ect consumer demand.
TABLE 1.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS
Table 1.2 shows some county-level descriptive statistics for counties with some MA enrollment for the years 2004
and 2007. While Figure 1 showed that MA enrollment has grown over this period, Table 1.2 highlights how the MA
market has expanded both geographically and within each county. First, the table shows a dramatic geographic
expansion with over 2,000 additional counties with some MA enrollment. This expansion has led to penetration
into much smaller counties with the average county in 2007 having about half the number of eligible individuals and
half the number of enrollees than what is observed in 2004. Despite the large expansion into smaller counties, the
average county has a larger number of MA insurers competing, increasing from 1.1 to 1.58 and the penetration of
MA enrollment in each county has remained stable at around 10-11% of bene￿ciaries enrolled in MA plans.27 The
number of contracts in each market has increased even more than the number of insurers from 1.8 to about 5.
TABLE 1.2. CHANGES IN MARKET CHARACTERISTICS BY COUNTY
Table 1.3 shows how the di⁄erent types of contracts have evolved from 2004 to 2007. The three types of plans
shown in Table 1.3 include network based contracts that require a "Referral", those that have "No Referral", and
the "PFFS" contracts that do not have a network.28 The most striking change is an expansion in the number of less
restrictive contracts. The number of "No Referral" contracts o⁄ered in counties increased by 2,825 and the share of
enrollment in those contracts grew from just 10% to 27%. In addition, there were almost 8,000 new PFFS contracts
introduced in counties, increasing the share of enrollment in PFFS from 0.8% in 2004 to 20% in 2007. The PFFS
contracts have been particularly successful in rural areas that previously did not o⁄er MA plans. All contract types
experienced a large increase in average MA reimbursement rates that appears correlated with an increase in drug
bene￿ts and a reduction in premiums. Even though the change in average OOPC for medical services was relatively
￿ at over this period, in 2007 more bene￿ciaries were enrolled in broader less restrictive contracts, so the average
enrollee had in-network access to a greater number of doctors. The signi￿cant changes in premiums, bene￿ts and
network size over time are helpful in identifying the impact of changes in these key variables on MA enrollment.
26The premium reported in the table excludes the part B premium. Most Medicare eligible individuals pay for the part B premium
regardless of choosing an MA product or traditional Medicare. While it is possible for MA plans to charge negative premiums (i.e. pay
for a portion of the part B premium), only a small fraction of plans choose to do so..
27An insurer had to have at least a 5% share of the MA enrollees to be counted as a competing insurer in the county.
28Since it was noted earlier that the de￿nition of a PPO and HMO is somewhat unclear and PPOs are rarely observed in 2003, I focus
on changes in contracts that require referrals and those that do not. In 2007 I ￿nd that 71% of the "No Referral" plans are PPO plans
while only 7% of "Referral" plans are PPO plans.
10TABLE 1.3. CHANGES IN CONTRACT AND MARKET CHARACTERISTICS BY CONTRACT TYPE
4 Demand Model
To estimate the impact of OOPC and premiums, I ￿rst specify a demand model for MA products. Each Medicare
enrollee makes a discrete choice of which option brings the greatest utility from among the MA options available and
an outside alternative. Following other studies of MA demand in the literature, including Town and Liu (2003),
Hall (2007), and more recently Dranove and Dafny (2008), this paper uses a multinomial logit demand model.
The basic approach follows Berry (1994) by specifying a model of consumer demand that uses market-level data to
derive a simple linear regression equation that corresponds to a discrete-choice model of consumer demand. The
characteristics of the contracts a⁄ect the average desirability, but consumers have distinct taste for the di⁄erent
insurance o⁄erings. MA contracts are grouped in a nest to allow for substitution among MA contracts to di⁄er from
substitution between MA contracts and the outside alternative.
The utility function of Medicare bene￿ciary i consuming contract j in market m at time t is:
uijmt = ￿jmt + &iGroup(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)"ijmt
= ￿￿pjmt ￿ ￿1OOPC Drugsjmt ￿ ￿2OOPC Medicaljmt + ￿3Xjmt + ￿jmt + &iGroup(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)"ijmt
The indirect utility uijmt is a function of the mean utility for the product, ￿jmt, and an idiosyncratic component
unique to each individual, &iGroup(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)"ijmt. The mean utility is a comprised of the premium charged,
pjmt; the expected out-of-pocket cost for prescription drugs, OOPC Drugsjmt; and the OOPC for medical services,
OOPC Medicaljmt. The OOPC variables enter the model linearly and capture the disutility of greater expected
OOPC for enrollees.
If medical expenditures are certain, then one would expect the coe¢ cients on OOPC to be the same as the
coe¢ cient on the premium, ￿ = ￿1 = ￿2. However, risk averse consumers may place a higher value on uncertain
medical expenditures, implying that one should expect ￿1 > ￿ and ￿2 > ￿. Although this strict interpretation
provides some useful insight into the economic meaning to these coe¢ cients, recall that the OOPC estimates are not
precisely the amount an individual might expect to pay. In addition, the model presented here does not formally
address issues of adverse selection. It is more realistic to view the OOPC variables as indexes used to approximate
an expected OOPC amount, so in some cases it is possible that ￿1 < ￿ or ￿2 < ￿. For example, the OOPC variables
are constructed assuming health care consumption is ￿xed, but one might ￿nd ￿1 < ￿ or ￿2 < ￿ if consumers are
able to shift medical expenses as OOPC increase. This may be an issue for prescription drugs where splitting pills
or shifting to less costly generics can reduce OOPC.
The speci￿cation also includes other observable bene￿t and plan characteristics that enter the vector Xjmt. The
11average value of the unobservable product characteristics is ￿jmt. The unobserved characteristics may include
reputation, unique qualities of the provider network, or other unobserved attributes. Di⁄erences across bene￿ciaries
and their preferences for contracts in the MA group and the non-MA group are captured by &iGroup(￿) which depends
on ￿. The parameter ￿ will range between 0 and 1 with values close to 0 indicating substitution patterns do not
di⁄er across the nests and a value closer to 1 indicates that the correlation within the nest is high. The term "ijmt
is the idiosyncratic error term of the bene￿ciary that is distributed i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value.
The outside good includes non-MA options such as traditional Medicare or a combination of traditional Medicare
and Medigap supplementary plans. Medigap plans are a supplement to traditional Medicare that provides additional
coverage, while MA plans are actually a replacement for traditional Medicare. Medigap plans are typically more
expensive than MA plans and are purchased disproportionately by individuals with higher incomes (Atherly and
Thrope (2005)). Medicaid may be an alternative outside option for some low-income bene￿ciaries.29 In 2007 the
outside good may also include a combination of traditional Medicare and Medicare Part D. The utility of the outside
alternative ui0mt is normalized to zero.
The model is well suited for the analysis of MA markets. It is a structural demand model that corrects for
changes in the choice set caused by entry and exit, which is important given the rapid expansion of MA insurance
over the period studied. The model also captures substitution among MA plans as well as substitution between
MA plans and traditional Medicare. The parameters of the structural model are used to measure the e⁄ects of the
premium, OOPC, and network size on demand and are also used to estimate consumer surplus.
The parameters of the demand model are estimated by applying the method proposed in Berry (1994) and
estimating the following linear equation:
ln(sjmt) ￿ ln(s0mt) = ￿￿pjmt ￿ ￿1OOPC Drugsjmt ￿ ￿2OOPC Medicaljmt +
+￿3Xjmt + ￿ ln(sjjMA) + ￿jmt
where the share of contract j is denoted sjmt and the market share of the outside good is s0mt. The share sjjMA
is the share of contract j conditional on choosing a MA product.
The demand model also includes county ￿xed e⁄ects and state-time dummy variables. The county ￿xed e⁄ect
account for all factors that a⁄ect the mean utility of the outside good that are unique to the a county and invariant
over time. For instance, to the extent that average health or income varies across markets and a⁄ects the utility
of selecting the outside alternative, these ￿xed e⁄ects account for these factors. State-time dummy variables are
included to account for changes in demand that vary over time and are common across the state. The state-
time dummy variables are especially important in accounting for changes in the outside options, such as Medigap.
29The Medicaid program provides insurance coverage for low income individuals and about 9% of individuals are eligible for both
Medicaid and Medicare bene￿ts.
12Medigap plans are typically o⁄ered on a statewide basis, so the state-time dummy variables account for changes in
the mean utility of the Medigap options.30
For estimating the demand model, the sample is further limited to the counties with at least 500 eligible bene￿cia-
ries and 100 enrollees observed for at least two years of the data. This limited sample is used for two reasons. The
county ￿xed e⁄ects included in the model are likely to explain nearly all of the contract shares for smaller counties
because there is often only one insurer in smaller counties and no time variation within a county. In addition, the
full sample would include a large number of observations from relatively rural counties with little enrollment. The
restricted sample contains over 95% of MA enrollment.31 Although the estimates are performed on a restricted
sample, the surplus estimates and elasticities reported are based on the full sample.
Instruments: The unobserved product speci￿c error, ￿jmt, is potentially correlated with the premium, OOPC
variables, and conditional market shares included on the right hand side of the regression equation above. Therefore,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the model is likely to be bias. To correct for potential biases in the
model I employ a two-stage least squares instrumental variable approach. There are four di⁄erent sets of instruments
applied in the analysis.
First, similar to others in the literature, I use the mean MA reimbursement rate in other counties in which the
contract operates. The average payment in the surrounding areas are partly based on the cost of operating in the
area and are determined by CMS. Second, characteristics of competing contracts within the county market are used
as instruments for within-group share. The assumption is that certain characteristics of rival products are ￿xed and
exogenous to price setting in the current period, which is a reasonable assumption for certain product characteristics.
The age of competitor contracts are assumed to be exogenous, so the average age of competing contracts in the
market, the average age of competing insurers, and the maximum age of competing contracts in the market are used
as instruments. I also include a variable for the average size of competitor networks. The rival network size is
unlikely to be endogenous since networks change relatively slowly because insurer contracts with physicians are often
￿xed for multiple years.
The third set of instruments is based on contract observations in other geographic markets similar to the strategy
of Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001). The basic idea behind selecting premium and OOPC values in other markets
as instruments is that common shocks to marginal cost will be re￿ ected in changes in these variables in other counties
30The state-time dummy variables and county ￿xed e⁄ects may also help control for changes in the outside alternative due to the
introduction of Medicare Part D drug plan or changes in the Medicaid program. In addition, they help control for restrictions in the
logit error term that prevent the models from predicting zero market share. Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) propose correcting for the
problem by introducing the number of products in the market as an explanatory variable to allow the importance of the logit errors to
change as new product are introduced. However, their proposed ￿x may be problematic if the number of competitors in the market
is determined endogenously. As an alternative, the county and state-time dummy variables are an excellent predictor of the number
of contracts in each market (with an Adjusted R-squared of 0.94), allowing ￿exibility in the logit error across markets and over time,
without introducing endogeneity.
31The estimation results are similar if I include only counties with all three years of data.
13that are uncorrelated with unobserved plan characteristics, ￿jmt. Instruments include the minimum of premium,
OOPC for drugs, and OOPC for medical services in other counties in which the contract operates. Each instrument
is a⁄ected uniquely by di⁄erent costs. For instance, the OOPC variables are likely impacted by the marginal cost
of using the respective services (i.e. prescription drugs and medical services), while the premium is more likely to
be a⁄ected by the marginal cost per enrollee, holding OOPC constant. I only select the minimum as an instrument
for a variable if it is di⁄erent from the value of that variable in the observed market. If the premiums or OOPC
are the same across di⁄erent markets, this indicates that prices in the di⁄erent geographic markets are set together
and are more likely to be invalid instruments.32 In addition to using the ￿rms own premiums, I also examine the
average of the premium, OOPC for drugs, and OOPC for medical services of rivals in other counties in which the
contract operates. Rival insurers may share similar costs in other counties, but demand in a each county is speci￿c
to that county, so rival premiums and OOPC variables in other counties are uncorrelated with unobserved plan
characteristics. Hall (2007) takes a similar strategy in using rival prices in other markets.
For the third set of instruments to be valid, the changes in the premium and OOPC of the contracts in other
markets must be correleted through shared marginal costs and uncorrelated with unobserved demand, ￿jmt. Marginal
costs are likely to be correlated across markets because many of the decisions made by insurers a⁄ect costs across
broad geographic areas. Some of the common costs include insurer administrative costs, regional labor market costs
for medical professionals, and negotiating with consolidated providers that have a presence across a broad geographic
area (E.g. The Health Corporation of America hospital system includes hundreds of hospitals and spans multiple
states). The regional di⁄erences in medical costs have also been noted in the health literature. Fisher et al (2006)
document large di⁄erences in medical costs across geographic areas (and di⁄erences in medical cost growth), which
they largely attribute to di⁄erences in physician practices across areas. In contrast, the demand for medical services
for consumers tend to be relatively local. For instance, numerous studies have found that consumers tend not
to travel far hospital services (e.g. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and Ho (2006)). While the above arguments suggest
that bene￿ts in other geographic markets are valid instruments, it is important to note that if the bene￿ts in other
geographic markets are correlated with demand shocks, then the reported estimates are likely to be biased.
As an alternative to assuming independence of demand shocks across geographic markets, which has been applied
in previous literature, the fourth set of instruments assumes that unobserved demand shocks are uncorrelated with
lagged OOPC and lagged premium. This assumption is particularly appearling post-MMA, when much of the
movement in MA demand is caused by policy changes in the MA program, and rates are increasing over this time
period. The economic importance of MA rates can be seen by examining broad trends relating enrollment to
MA rates (as shown in ￿gure 1 previously), but more detailed statistical analysis has con￿rmed that MA payment
32To examine whether this is an issue in practice, I also estimate the model by selecting all premiums and OOPCs in other markets
as instruments, even if they are equal to the observed premiums and OOPC. The results are very similar to OLS regression results
demonstrating that excluding markets with identical premiums and OOPCs appears to have a substantial impact on estimation results.
14rates are an important determinant of product o⁄erings, even after conditioning on numerous other factors a⁄ecting
demand (See Abraham et al 2000). Moreover, interviews with MA insurers have con￿rmed that the MA rate is a
critical determinant of product o⁄erings in di⁄erent counties (See Gold 2006). In addition, it may be di¢ cult for
insurers to set bene￿ts in anticipation of future demand because there is uncertainty regarding government policies.
For instance, Gold (2006) reports that MA insurers paid close attention to the rates in an area, but insurers also
noted the importance of considering the risks associated with the potential for future reduction in MA rates.33 In
contrast to the dramatic shift in demand caused by policy changes, the underlying cost structure of the insurers are
likely to shift more slowly, since the duration of agreements with providers are often for multiple years. Therefore,
the lagged premium and OOPC variables should be good proxies for the underlying cost in each market, but should
be uncorrelated with current demand shocks. This fourth instrument set also includes a dummy variable of whether
the contract is observed in the prior period and a lagged indicator of whether the contract o⁄ers drug coverage in
the prior period.34 This strategy will produce bias estimates if lagged premiums and OOPC are correlated with the
unobserved demand shocks, ￿jmt.
Contrasting estimates that apply either the third or fourth instrument set is a useful check on the robustness of
the results under two distinct assumptions regarding the demand unobservables.35
5 Consumer Surplus and Insurer Pro￿ts
Using the estimates of the demand model, I follow the standard approach to estimating consumer surplus outlined
by McFadden (1983). Consumer surplus, CSmt, for a 12 month period may be calculated for a representative person











j2m exp(￿jmt=(1 ￿ ￿)). The consumer surplus is the utility an individual receives above her
expected utility from traditional Medicare and other outside options. This value is ￿rst estimated for each county
33In addition, insurer stock prices appear to be responsive to the announcement of new rates, highlighting market uncertainty about
MA rate setting policy. "Insurers to Get Higher Medicare Payments" Article from:AP Online Article date" Associated Press, April 3,
2007
34The lagged premium and lagged prescription drug indicator is drawn from 2003 data. These variables help account for missing
OOPC information in the year prior to 2004.
35Recent work by Lustig (2008) also considers the endogeneity of plan bene￿ts. However, his work does not include the OOPC measure
that incorporates more extensive plan information. In addition, his approach to controlling for endogeneity is di⁄erent from the approach
taken in this paper. He assumes that there is an unobserved characteristic for each contract, but there is no unobserved characteristic
at the plan level, and uses this assumption to identify the value of plan bene￿ts. My model is inconsistent if the chosen instruments
are invalid, while Lustig￿ s model is inconsistent if there are unobserved demand characteristics at the plan level that are correlated with
bene￿t information.
15and then surplus for the entire U.S. is estimated by aggregating across counties.
Using the above demand estimates along with assumptions about the pricing behavior of providers I estimate
marginal costs and pro￿ts, as well as the a⁄ect of OOPC on the marginal cost of insurers. I assume a static Bertrand
model assuming costs are ￿xed in the upstream market. This should be viewed as an approximation because CMS
regulation potentially a⁄ects insurer strategies in all years and the introduction of a bidding mechansim in 2006
could alters how they set bene￿ts and premiums in 2007. Moreover, the assumptions imposed on the behavior of
insurers are arguably strong because, in general, it is unclear what type of game insurers are playing (i.e. dynamic
vs static; collusive or competitive; Cournot vs Bertrand pricing; maximize pro￿ts downstream (one-sided game) vs
maximizing pro￿ts considering the impact in the upstream and downstream markets (two-sided game)).36 The
relevant equations for a single contract are presented to simplify notation, but the actual calculation accounts for the
full ownership matrix of each insurer in each market. The pro￿t in county m for contract j is given by the equation:
￿jmt = (MAratemt + pjmt ￿ mcjmt(OOPCjmt))sjmtMmt ￿ Fjmt
In the above equation, MAratemt, is the amount that Medicare reimburses insurers in market m in year t. The
marginal cost, mcjmt, is a function of the out-of-pocket cost, OOPCjmt. The ￿xed cost associated with o⁄ering a
contract is Fmt.37 Assuming a Nash equilibrium in premiums the ￿rst-order condition for contract j is:






An estimate of the elasticity together with the previous equation may be used to estimate marginal cost, mcjmt =





sjmt. I also assume that insurers pro￿t maximize with respect to OOPCjmt by
setting OOPCjmt to maximize pro￿ts. The derivative of the pro￿t function w.r.t. OOPC is the following:







Next, I solve for the marginal e⁄ect of OOPC on marginal cost of insurers,
dmcjmt
dOOPCjmt.38 The marginal e⁄ect,
dmcjmt
dOOPCjmt, is of interest for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that OOPCjmt represents the amount a
36Strategic decisions of insurers that a⁄ect enrollment downstream may also impact upstream costs. (See Sorenson (2003) for an
empirical analysis of factors impacting insurer hospital costs. See Ho (2009) for a more formal empirical model of strategic contracting
between hospitals and insurers.)
37The ￿xed costs are calculated as in Town and Liu. I assume a free entry equilibirum, so that plans only enter a market if it is
pro￿table. Under this assumption, the plan with the lowest variable pro￿t in a county is set equal to the ￿xed cost for entering the
county, which may be considered an upper bound on the ￿xed cost from entry. This assumption may be problematic, if it actually takes
several years for insurers to become pro￿table in a county.
38I calculate an approximation of the e⁄ect of coverage on marginal cost. This paper does not attempt to formally model the costs
associated with moral hazard or adverse selection. In particular, consumer heterogeneity in preferences for coverage is an essential feature
for modeling adverse selection, which is absent in this empirical model. See Lustig (2008) for a more thorough examination of adverse
16bene￿ciary would actually spend (e.g. the OOPC estimate of $60 implies that bene￿ciaries are expected to spend
precisely $60 on average), one might expect this derivative to be equal to 1 because each additional dollar covered
by the insurer is an additional dollar spent by the insurer. Therefore, if the value is above 1 it suggests consumers
spend more when coverage is greater. In this case, a value above 1 may indicate the presence of adverse selection
or moral hazard. However, if the value is below 1 it suggests that other factors may in￿ uence insurer costs, so
there is an imperfect relationship between OOPC and cost to insurers (e.g. adding bene￿ts for a branded drug may
not increase consumption if insurers provide incentives that steer bene￿ciaries to less costly alternatives as bene￿ts
increase). Second, the ability of insurers to in￿ uence marginal cost by changing OOPC suggests that coverage
should be considered when analyzing the cost function of insurers and measuring economies or diseconomies of scale.
If an anticompetitive merger causes a reduction in coverage, rather than a reduction in premiums; then ignoring the
impact of coverage on insurers cost may incorrectly lead a researchers to conclude that a merger is e¢ cient, since
premiums would stay the same but costs would fall. The value of
dmcjmt
dOOPCjmt is useful since it provides a measurement
of how much insurer marginal costs are a⁄ected by coverage.
To solve for
dmcjmt












dOOPCjmt can both be derived from parameters in the estimated demand equation.39
6 Results
The ￿rst 5 columns of Table 2 present the estimates of the demand model using the ￿rst three sets of instruments
which excludes the lagged premium and lagged OOPC instruments. The ￿rst column shows the main results from the
nested logit demand model. The coe¢ cient on the premium is -0.0054 and statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on
the expected OOPC for prescription drugs and medical services are negative and precisely estimated with coe¢ cient
values of -0.0028 and -0.0085. Model 1 results are consistent with consumers valuing plans with lower premiums
and lower expected OOPC. The nesting parameter that is estimated from the logarithm of the contracts conditional
share is highly signi￿cant with a coe¢ cient of 0.67. This implies a high degree of within-nest correlation among MA
plans, so that consumers purchasing MA products are likely to substitute among MA plans and less likely to select
traditional Medicare and other outside alternatives.40 Model 2 explores the impact of including a drug insurance
dummy. The dummy variable in Model 2 accounts for the value of drug insurance that is not captured by the
selection issues and the associated costs. In addition, the coverage choices may be endogenous to unobserved costs which might bias the
estimates toward zero.
39In 2007 the MA Rate is di⁄erent than the amount paid to insurers in 2007 because of the bidding system. In calculating pro￿ts I
adjust this ￿gures to re￿ect that the payments are typically slightly below the benchmark level.
40The appendix presents results from the ￿rst-stage regressions on pjmt, OOPC Drugsjmt, OOPC Medicaljmt, and ln(sjjMA) on
the instruments and other exogenous variables. If the chosen instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, then the
IV estimates are likely to perform poorly. The selected instruments are signi￿cant and applying an F test the null hypothesis that the
instruments are zero is rejected.
17OOPC prescription drug variable, but it appears that its inclusion is not statistically signi￿cant and it also appears
to interfere with the identi￿cation of the expected OOPC coe¢ cient (likely caused by multicollinearity), so Model 1
is the preferred speci￿cation.
Looking at the results from Model 1, the coe¢ cient on expected OOPC for medical services implies that a one
dollar reduction in expected OOPC for medical services in the future is worth about $1.50 in premiums today. As
discussed previously, one interpretation is that risk averse bene￿ciaries value a reduction in uncertain expenditures
more than certain expenditure on the contract￿ s premium. In contrast, the coe¢ cient on expected OOPC for drug
expenditures is smaller than the premium coe¢ cient. This may be caused by bene￿ciaries being less sensitive to
changes in drug coverage, perhaps due to a greater ability to shift to cheaper prescription drugs as the amount of
coverage falls.
The coe¢ cient on the log of network size is positive and statistically signi￿cant implying that consumers value
insurance networks with more physicians.41 As theory would predict, the interaction of requiring referral and
network size is negative, but the coe¢ cient is statistically insigni￿cant. A negative coe¢ cient implies that requiring
consumers to obtain a referral before seeing a physician reduces the value of the network size. A discussion of the
coe¢ cients on the other variables included in the model is contained in the appendix.
TABLE 2. DEMAND ESTIMATES
Model 3 explores the impact of including contract ￿xed e⁄ects. The additional ￿xed e⁄ects are appealing because
they control for unobserved factors that are invariant over time and across markets, but there are a number of
potential econometric problems caused by introducing additional ￿xed e⁄ects. First, the contract ￿xed e⁄ects
eliminate potentially exogenous variation in OOPC used to identify key parameters. Second, as noted previously,
the e⁄ect of OOPC may be more appropriately used to explain di⁄erences in enrollment across contracts within
a year, rather than changes in a contracts across years because the measurement of the OOPC variables change
slightly across years as di⁄erent individuals are used from the MCBS survey. Third, ￿xed e⁄ects tend to exaggerate
"errors-in-variables" biases, which is a bias that arises from not being able to statistically test the in￿ uence of an
explanatory variable because it is measured with error (See Griliches and Hausman (1986)). This might be a problem
for the OOPC variables that change across years and are constructed from an average across plans. Fourth, while
the problems of included contract ￿xed e⁄ects may be small if there were additional years of data, the panel is
relatively short reducing the amount of variation observed in the sample. Therefore, for many contracts there is
41The assumed log functional form was checked by estimating an alternative speci￿cation that included the network size and network
size squared in the regression. I found a decline in the value of the network as the network size increased that roughly followed the log
functional form. Alternatively, one could specify the model as some fraction of available doctors or perhaps of the potential population
of eligible bene￿ciaries, log(Njmt=Eligible). However, this will have little e⁄ect on the model if the total potential market size stays
relatively ￿xed since log(Njmt=Eligible) = log(Njmt) ￿ log(Eligible) and county ￿xed and state-time ￿xed e⁄ects are included in the
model that would absorb the log(Eligible) term.
18little cross-market or time variation in market shares or contract characteristics. Finally, the explanatory power
of Model 1 appears to be high, reporting a within R-squared elasticity of 0.89, reducing the possibility of omitted
variable bias.
Despite the potential problems with including contract ￿xed e⁄ects, the estimates from such a model provide
insight into the source of identi￿cation and the robustness of the results. Model 3 reports estimate that includes
contract ￿xed e⁄ects. The results show that the coe¢ cients on premiums and OOPC for medical services are negative
and statistically signi￿cant. This implies that the impact of changes in OOPC for medical services and premiums
may be identi￿ed through changes in premium and coverage over time and di⁄erences across markets. However,
the model was unable to precisely identify the coe¢ cient on OOPC for prescription drugs. Other than the inability
to precisely identify the OOPC for prescription drugs, the results are qualitatively similar those found in Model 1.
Model 4 is the same as Model 1 but excludes instruments for the OOPC variables to demonstrate the impact of
instrumenting for coverage. Model 4 shows that the OOPC for medical services is insigni￿cant and the economic value
of coverage is minimal, with each dollar reduction in OOPC for medical services valued at around 25 cents. Model 4
also predicts that OOPC for prescription drugs is valued about 30% less than in Model 1. So, as one might predict,
the impact of not instrumenting introduces a signi￿cant underestimate of the value of coverage. In particular, one
might expect pro￿t maximizing insurers to set lower bene￿ts if unobserved utility is higher, introducing a downward
bias on the value of coverage.
To show the impact of instrumenting for premiums, Model 5 is identical to Model 4 but is estimated without
instrumenting for the premium. Estimates from Models 5 are consistent with contract premiums being positively
correlated with unobserved demand shocks that would cause OLS estimates to have an upward bias on the premium
coe¢ cient. A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that an OLS estimate of Model 1 is consistent. Moreover,
the OLS estimates imply extremely low elasticities and implausibly large pro￿t margins for MA insurers.42 Applying
the instruments has the expected e⁄ect on the key model coe¢ cients, which o⁄ers additional support for applying
this instrumenting strategy.
Next Model 6 shows the results using the alternative instrumenting strategy based on the lagged premium and
lagged OOPC variables, and excludes instruments that use the premiums and OOPC in other markets. Similar to
Model 1 results, the results from Model 6 predict a higher value of coverage relative to OLS estimates.43 However,
the key di⁄erence is that the Model 6 results suggest a much higher value of coverage compared to Model 1. More
precisely, each dollar reduction in expected OOPC of drugs is worth about $2 in premiums today and each dollar
42The Government Accountability O¢ ce found that for a large sample of MA insurers the ratio of medical expenses to revenues in
2005 was around 85.7%. Since this excludes administrative costs, this sets a rough upper bound for pro￿t margins of around 14.3%.
The Model 1 estimates imply industry pro￿t margin of 12.7% in 2004, 15.4% in 2005 and 12.8% in 2007. In contrast, the parameters in
Model 5 imply pro￿t margins above 60% in every year.
43Applying the same robustness checks to Model 6 also produce qualitatively similar results to Model 1 estimates. The appendix
reports ￿rst stage results of Model 6, which shows that ￿rst stage instruments are highly signi￿cant.
19reduction in expected OOPC of medical services is worth more than $3 today. Moreover, if one interprets the
OOPC variable as an expected payment then Model 6 produces results that are more plausible theoretically because
￿1 > ￿ and ￿2 > ￿. Although the estimated value of coverage in Model 1 is smaller than Model 6, the estimates
from Model 1 provide an important conservative benchmark and is the preferred speci￿cation assuming costs are
correlated across geographic markets but demand unobservables are not.
Models 1 and Model 6 di⁄er in their estimated value of coverage, but both the nesting parameter, ￿, and ￿ are
nearly identical across the two models, which implies that the welfare calculations, premium elasticities, and pro￿t
estimates are very close in value. Therefore, I will focus on Model 1 estimates that produce more conservative
predictions when examining welfare calculations, premium elasticities, and pro￿t estimates, but when evaluating the
impact of coverage I will contrast the more conservative estimates from Model 1 with the results from Model 6.44





measure responsiveness to premiums, even when premiums are zero. The average semi-elasticity with respect to
the premium from Model 1 is -0.0129, which is a bit higher than prior estimates. Town and Liu ￿nd an elasticity
of -0.009 and Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman (2003) use individual data from the MCBS and ￿nd a semi-elasticity of
-0.007.45 One potential reason for this di⁄erence is that Model 1 instruments for bene￿ts, but the other papers do
not, which potentially introduces bias. I ￿nd that when I do not instrument for OOPC bene￿t information (Model
4) I obtain a premium elasticity of -0.0105, which is closer in value to the previous literature. For Model 1, the
average semi-elasticity with respect to OOPC for medical services is very high, -0.020, suggesting that consumers
are very responsive to changes in coverage for medical services, but they appear to be less responsive to changes in
prescription drug coverage that has a semi-elasticity of -0.007. Consumers are much more responsive to OOPC
based on the Model 6 estimates with respecitve semi-elasticities of -0.046 and -0.026.
The results may also be used to estimate the e⁄ect of changes in OOPC on insurer marginal cost. Using equation
(2) and Model 1 estimates, I calculate the e⁄ect of OOPC variables on the marginal cost of insurers and ￿nd that for
prescription drugs
dmcjmt
dOOPC Drugjmt is -.46 and that for other medical services
dmcjmt
dOOPC Medicaljmt is -1.54 based on Model
1 estimates. Using Model 6 estimates the impact of coverage on the marginal cost to consumers is much higher
44In addition to the above checks, I also explore adding an additional nest where contracts are grouped into those that o⁄er drug
insurance and those that do not. While there is some evidence of correlation among plans within the additional subnest, it is not
strong and is not robust across alternative speci￿cations (i.e. I cannot reject they hypothesis of a single nest for MA products). Results
reported in Hall (2007) using a similar model also suggest that an additional nest for prescription drugs adds little to the model. More
importantly, I ￿nd similar statisical signi￿cance and economic importance of the OOPC variables using this alternative speci￿cation, and
there is little impact on the overall welfare estimates.
To check if aggregating plan o⁄erings introduces bias I estimate the above models using only those contracts with a single plan o⁄ering.
I ￿nd qualitatively similar results to those reported in the paper. However, I hesitate to rely on these estimates because the sample size
shrinks to 25% of the observations from the full sample and I lose statistical signi￿cance on the OOPC for prescription drugs variable.
45One potential reason that the results in Town and Liu and this paper show higher elasticities is that we both the use of IV techniques
that correct for endogeneity bias.
20suggesting moral hazard and adverase selection costs for both forms of coverage are very high. Model 6 estimates
imply that for prescription drug coverage
dmcjmt
dOOPC Drugjmt is -1.91 and for other medical services
dmcjmt
dOOPC Medicaljmt
is -3.16. Across both models, the OOPC for medical services have a much greater impact on the marginal cost
of insurers than the OOPC for drugs. The di⁄erence in the magnitude may be explained by a greater ability of
insurers to manage the additional cost of providing increased bene￿ts for drug services relative to medical services
where both adverse selection and moral hazard may have a greater impact on insurer costs.
The demand parameters estimated above may be used to estimate consumer surplus and pro￿ts. For each year
of the sample, Table 3 shows total government expenditure, the percentage cost of MA above traditional Medicare,
net cost to the government, estimated pro￿ts and consumer surplus. The estimates show that from 2004 to 2007
spending in the program has increased by 80% and consumer surplus has increased almost 60%. By 2007 consumer
surplus in the MA program was $21 billion and total government spending was $77.0 billion.46
TABLE 3. CONSUMER SURPLUS AND PROFIT ESTIMATES
While the above estimates suggest large gains in consumer surplus and pro￿ts from the MA program, policymakers
should also consider the additional cost to the government. The net surplus from the MA program has two
components: the consumer surplus from the MA program and the cost to the government. The consumer surplus
is the total additional surplus from MA products present in the market relative to the surplus attained from all
bene￿ciaries staying in traditional Medicare (i.e. CSMA ￿ CSTraditional Medicare). The cost to the government is
the additional amount the government must pay to reimburse insurers for individuals enrolled in the MA program
relative to their cost in traditional Medicare, (i.e. CMS Payments￿Expected Cost Traditional Medicare), which
is the net cost of the MA program. Taking these two pieces together, the net welfare formula is the additional
consumer surplus minus the additional net cost to the government.47 It is important to highlight that this de￿nition
of net welfare may overstate the e¢ ciency of the program because it does not consider either the cost to society of
taxation or the opportunity cost of spending government funds on alternative government programs.
NetWelfare = (CSMA ￿ CMS Payments)
￿(CSTraditional Medicare ￿ Expected Cost Traditional Medicare)
The equation above implies that the net welfare may be di⁄erent from consumer surplus if the cost of the MA
program is di⁄erent from the cost of traditional Medicare. As stated previously, estimates from MedPac suggest
46The consumer welfare ￿gure in 2004 of $13.2 billion is only slightly lower than the estimates reported in Hall (2007) for the year 2002
of $14.8. To make this comparison I adjust Hall￿ s reported consumer welfare to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
47Town and Liu considers net welfare to include MA pro￿ts, but this de￿nition of net welfare implicitly assumes that the government
run traditional Medicare program has zero pro￿ts, which may be a strong assumption. I assume that pro￿ts to the government from
traditional FFS Medicare are identical to those of MA insurers and so I exclude MA pro￿ts in the net welfare calculation. However,
estimated pro￿ts to private insurers are provided so alternative de￿nitions of net welfare can be derived.
21that the MA rates in 2007 were about 12% more than the cost of traditional Medicare, while rates in 2004 were closer
to the cost of traditional Medicare at just 7% above traditional Medicare cost.48 Using 2007 ￿gures, I calculate
the spending above cost to be CMS Payments ￿ Expected Cost Traditional Medicare = $9.2 billion, so the net
welfare in 2007 is a more modest $11.8 billion. For 2004, the additional cost to the government is estimated to
be $3.2 billion implying a net welfare ￿gure of $10.2 billion for 2004. Using these estimates, the increase in net
welfare from 2004 to 2007 is $1.6 billion. Although the additional cost to the government has increased by 80%, net
welfare in the program increased by only 15.7%. Therefore, under these assumptions, the gain in consumer surplus
signi￿cantly overstates the net gains from the increase in MA payments.49
The net surplus generated by the MA program should be of interest to policymakers, but the wide disparity
in payments across di⁄erent plans makes it important to also explore the amount of net surplus generated by the
di⁄erent plan options. The end of the next section looks at the surplus generated by the contracts receiving the
largest payments from the government relative to the contracts that are less costly contracts.
7 Policy Analysis
This section conducts a number of counterfactual experiments to examine how adjustments to insurance character-
istics a⁄ect consumer surplus. For each experiment I will contrast the more conservative results based on Model 1
48These ￿gures are from chapter 4 Update on Medicare Private Plans for 2007 page 244 and are based on 2006 estimates. The 2006
estimates appear to be a good approximation to actual payments since the estimates have changed little in 2008 estimates reported in the
2008 MedPac study. In calculating expenditure ￿gures I account for the benchmark rate in counties being di⁄erent from the actual amount
paid to insurers. For instance, the benchmark relative to traditional Medicare expenditures is reported to be 115% (=Benchmark/Cost
of Traditional) of traditional Medicare for HMO plans, but the payments were just 110% (=Payment/Cost of Traditional) of FFS
expenditures. To calculate the payment from the benchmark I use the ratio of the two ￿gures: Benchmark*(110/115 )= Payment.
While payments to insurers di⁄er across local markets, this approach should provide an reasonable estimate for aggregate national
estimates. I obtain the 2004 ￿gures chapter 4 Update on Medicare Private Plans for 2004 page 210. For 2005 I assume the additional
cost is 10%, which is the midpoint between the 2004 and 2007 estimates.
49In the prior work of Town and Liu (2003) and Hall (2007) they also calculated net welfare, but they had to account for the fact that
more healthy individuals might select MA plans. In particular, if healthier individuals select MA insurers, as several studies suggest, and
the government payments do not adjust for health risk; then the government is likely to overpay MA insurers to cover a relatively healthy
population. This does not appear to be an issue in 2007 because payments to insurers are fully risk adjusted. In 2007 CMS payments
account for both the demographics and health risk of individuals in setting payments to insurers, so the selection of healthier individuals
by MA insurers is unlikely to lead to a bias in the estimates of the additional cost to the government. However, in 2004 the payments to
insurers only consider the demographic di⁄erences of enrollees and may be impacted by selection. If, in fact, MA plans select a healthier
population in 2004, this may lead to greater costs to the government than the assumed 7% reported in MedPac (2004). Supposing that
costs were 5% greater than MedPac reports, so the additional cost of MA enrollees are 12% above the cost of traditional Medicare, the
net welfare gain from 2004 to 2007 would be $3.8 billion. These calculations do not incorporate the possibility of bene￿cial spillovers. A
recent study by Chernew, DeCicca and Town (2008) show that additional penetration in the private Medicare market lead to reduced
medical care expenditures incurred by traditional Medicare fee-for-service enrollees. If higher spending leads to reduced expenditures in
traditional Medicare market, then net welfare calculations reported here are biased downward.
22estimates with results using Model 6 estimates. The consumer surplus in the counterfactual experiments is compared
to the benchmark surplus level in 2007 of $21 billion implied by both Model 1 and Model 6. The results are reported
in Table 4. The ￿rst four experiments demonstrate that OOPC have a signi￿cant in￿ uence on consumer surplus.
Experiment (1) shows that reducing OOPC for both medical and drug services by 50% increases surplus by 51% in
Model 1 and 264% in Model 2. In contrast, Experiment (2) sets the maximum premium to zero which increases
surplus by 48% in both models. The results from Experiments (1) and (2) show that OOPC can potentially have
a very large impact on consumer surplus, and can have more impact than changes in the premium on the plan.
While these experiments imply that changes in bene￿ts potentially have a large e⁄ect on consumer surplus, it is also
important to check whether OOPCs vary su¢ ciently across contracts to be economically important to consumers.
Conducting counterfactual experiments that are far from possible values that insurers might choose could overstate
(or understate) the importance of OOPC in practice (e.g. suppose OOPC vary only by a couple of dollars across
markets, but my experiments shift OOPC by hundreds of dollars). For Experiment (3) the OOPC variable is in-
creased so that the minimum of the OOPC variables is set to the 90th percentile. In this case, the percent reduction
in consumer surplus is 36.3% in Model 1 and 51.5% in Model 6. This value is contrasted with Experiment (4)
where the premium is increased by setting the minimum premium to the 90th percentile and welfare falls only 32.5%
relative to the benchmark. These experiments suggest that the observed di⁄erences in OOPC across contracts have
a greater impact on consumer surplus than the observed variation in premiums.
Experiment (5) and (6) examine the impact of di⁄erent medical and drug components of OOPC on consumer
surplus. Experiment (5) looks at removing drug coverage, which is equivalent to setting the OOPC for drug coverage
to the 90th percentile. Experiment (5) shows that removing drug insurance reduces consumer surplus in the program
by about 12% based on the more conservative estimates and around 35% based on less conservative estimates from
Model 6. Both estimates lie between the ranges reported by Town and Liu (2003) who ￿nd drug insurance accounts
for 45% of consumer surplus in the program in 2000, but larger than the estimates of Hall (2007) who ￿nd that drug
expenditures account for about 5% of consumer surplus in 2002.50 Unlike these studies, drug coverage in this paper
is a continuous measure that accounts for the large heterogeneity in drug coverage across markets.
While several studies have examined the value of drug coverage, the di⁄erences in coverage for other medical
services across contracts also have a substantial e⁄ect on surplus. Experiment (6) shows that increasing OOPC by
setting the minimum of OOPC for medical services to the 90th percentile has nearly as large an impact on consumer
surplus as removing drug coverage. Speci￿cally, Model 1 estimates imply a 4% larger impact on consumer surplus
relative to removing drug insurance and estimates from Model 6 imply a 6.5% smaller impact on surplus.
Experiments (9), (10) and (11) look at the e⁄ect of dropping di⁄erent types of contracts to evaluate their impact
50The fraction of surplus accounted for by drug bene￿ts in 2004, (not shown in the table), are about 5% lower than those reported for
2007 because drug bene￿ts were greater in 2007 relative to 2004. Therefore, the conservative estimates of the value of drug coverage are
quite close to the ￿ndings of Hall.
23on consumer surplus in the program. These experiments show that much of the consumer surplus in the program
is generated by the presence of HMO products (9) and that withdrawing these products from the market reduces
consumer surplus by around 40%. The impact from withdrawing either the PFFS product or local PPO products
is much less.
TABLE 4. POLICY EXPERIMENTS AND SURPLUS CHANGES 2007
While consumer surplus generated by the presence or withdrawal of these contracts indicates the value of these
plans to consumers, the wide disparity in the amount paid to di⁄erent plans makes it important to explore the
opportunity cost of funding each type of contract. Average government expenditures by type of plan are reported
to be the following: HMOs are paid 110% of traditional Medicare, local PPO plans are paid 117% and PFFS
contracts 119%. Therefore, on average, the PFFS contracts are the most costly for the government, while the HMO
contracts are the least expensive. Although some contract types are paid more by the government, it may be e¢ cient
to o⁄er additional funding if the additional spending increases consumer surplus by enough to generate positive net
surplus.
Table 5 explores the relative e¢ ciency of the di⁄erent contract types by examining how net surplus changes when
di⁄erent contract types are added to the system, while holding bene￿ts and average plan payments constant.51 I
assume that the amount Medicare payments vary is only a⁄ected by plan type because this is what is reported
in available MedPac reports. This may be a strong assumption because payments to plans vary greatly across
geographic markets. Despite the limitations of this approach, applying the assumption that payments vary by plan
type captures the general fact that on average HMOs tend to be much cheaper for the government than PFFS plans
and Local PPO plans. Column (1) shows the average additional percentage cost to fund MA enrollees for each plan
type. Column (2) shows the additional enrollment from adding the speci￿ed plan type. For instance, column (2)
row (1) shows the number of additional enrollees in the market induced by the introduction of HMO plans, relative
to the number of enrollees if HMO plans were removed from the market. Column (3) reports the total consumer
surplus gain from inclusion of the plan type in billions of dollars. For instance, the column shows that consumer
surplus increases by $8.50 billion dollars because of the existence of HMO plans. Column (4) reports the total
additional cost to the government from adding each plan type. It shows that adding HMOs increases government
costs by $930 million, but adding PFFS plans increases government costs by $1.37 billion. Column (5) reports the
net surplus gain from having the plan in the market (i.e. column (3) minus column (4)). Column (5) shows that
each plan type reports a net gain in surplus, with the greatest net surplus generated by HMO plans.
TABLE 5. ADDITIONAL SURPLUS GENERTED BY MAJOR PLAN TYPES
While each plan type produces a net surplus gain, there is wide variation in the amount of surplus and cost per
enrollee. Columns (7), (8) and (9) report consumer surplus, additional cost to the government, and net surplus
51It is assumed that bene￿ts stay ￿xed for all remaining plans. Examining the supply response of other plans in the market is outside
the scope of the analysis.
24generated per additional enrollee in the contract. That is, columns (7), (8) and (9) are estimated from columns (3),
(4), and (5) by dividing by the number of additional enrollees in column (2). PFFS plans generate the largest level
of consumer surplus per additional enrollee, at around $289, compared to around $248 for HMO and PPO plans.
Despite the large consumer surplus generated by PFFS plans, PFFS plans generate signi￿cantly less net surplus
because the additional payments to PFFS plans imply they are much more costly ($191 more per enrollee) relative
to HMO plans ($26 more per enrollee). The cost of additional HMO enrollees is low because they draw enrollees
away from more costly PFFS and PPO alternatives. Therefore, each additional consumer gained from o⁄ering a
HMO option increases net surplus by $220, on average, but the net surplus gained per enrolle in a PFFS plans is
considerably smaller at just $97 per enrollee. These counterfactual experiments indicate that although the PFFS
plans produce greater consumer surplus per enrollee, the net surplus generated per enrollee is lower because of the
additional cost to the government. The disparities in net surplus gains per enrollee suggest that policymakers should
explore the opportunity cost of additional funding to MA insurers, especially to the most highly paid PFFS and
PPO plans.
8 Conclusion
Insurance plans often contain hundreds of plan characteristics that a⁄ect the OOPC to consumers and may be
changed as easily as the premium on the plan. These OOPC bene￿ts may be especially important in the MA
market, where 20% of bene￿ciaries are enrolled in zero premium plans and a substantial fraction of bene￿ciaries
income is spent on OOPC. However, estimating the e⁄ect of OOPC on demand poses a challenge for researchers
who must incorporate a large number of plan bene￿ts in a demand model, but also consider the endogeneity of
bene￿ts. I address these problems in a discrete choice demand model by employing a unique measure of OOPC that
considers a consumer￿ s expected payments for a ￿xed bundle of health services and apply IV techniques to address
potential endogeneity bias.
The results of the demand model show that OOPC have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on surplus. Conservative estimates
suggest that increasing OOPC to the 90th percentile reduces overall surplus in the program by over 36%, while the
less conservative estimates suggest that overall surplus may fall by over 50%. In contrast, increasing the premium
to the 90th percentile reduces surplus by around 33% in both models, highlighting the relative importance of OOPC.
The large surplus e⁄ects from changes in OOPC con￿rms that coverage is highly valued by consumers. Moreover, I
￿nd the OOPC measure to be endogenous, so not instrumenting for OOPC produces bias estimates that signi￿cantly
underestimate the value of coverage.
In addition to exploring the impact of OOPC on consumer surplus, I use the estimated demand model to examine
the overall surplus generated by the MA program. I ￿nd that the surplus from the program is substantial with
consumer surplus estimated to be $21.0 billion in 2007. However, the bene￿t to society is signi￿cantly overstated
25by this ￿gure because the government payments to MA insurers exceed the cost to cover similar bene￿ciaries in
traditional Medicare by $9.2 billion. There appears to be a wide disparity in the amount paid to di⁄erent plans
across the country with HMO plans being paid 10% more than traditional Medicare and PFFS plans being paid
19% more. I ￿nd that the net surplus per enrollee on the less costly HMO plans is almost double the net surplus
generated by the PFFS plans. These results suggest that policymakers should evaluate the level of payments made
to MA insurers and consider reducing payments to the most highly paid plans.
There are a number of directions to extend the research presented here. First, this paper primarily focuses on
the demand-side of the market, but the results have implications for the supply-side. Both the economic importance
of coverage to consumers and the endogeneity of coverage imply that an important topic of future research is
to investigate how both coverage and premiums change with the competitive environment. Second, this paper
assumes that consumers do not have heterogenous preferences for coverage, but one might relax this assumption
by introducing random-coe¢ cients or micro level data that would allow less healthy individuals to prefer greater
coverage. In addition to improving the precision of the value of coverage estimates, this would allow for a more
￿ exible substitution among plans and would also allow one to look at issues of adverse selection (See Lustig (2009)).
Third, to the extent that OOPC may be viewed as a measure of quality, the results presented in this paper imply
that quality may be endogenous and that controlling for endogeneity may lead to a large increase in the estimated
e⁄ects of quality on health plan choice. Future research may bene￿t by taking an IV approach to looking at the
e⁄ects of certain quality measures on demand in health insurance markets, especially aspects of quality that may be
adjusted quickly in response to changes in the competitive environment.
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2910 Appendix
10.1 Data and Variables
Some additional variables are formed from the SCP enrollment data. Using historical enrollment data back to 2001
the age of each contract in each county is calculated. The age of the contract is the number of years that the contract
has been present in the county since 2001. I also construct a dummy variable indicating whether the contract was
present in 2001. The age of the contract may be related to the quality of the product since it may take experience
in a market to construct a quality network, develop a reputation in an area, and the contract age may also capture
switching costs for enrollees in older plans that would incur a disutility from changing plans.52 Another related
measure, the age of the insurer in the county since 2001, is also created. The age of the insurer is included because
the e⁄ect of age may not be speci￿c to a contract, but may actually be related to an insurer￿ s experience in the
market. Aside from being a useful control variable, the age of the insurer may also be of interest to those concerned
with the speed of new entry. In particular, the insurer￿ s age may indicate whether an incumbent insurer has an
advantage in launching new products relative to a new entrant.
The above data is supplemented with information about Medicare benchmark rates. These are the amounts MA
insurers are reimbursed for each enrollee.53 The rates are unique to each county and vary across years as methods
for determining reimbursements change. All monetary ￿gures in this paper are in￿ ated to 2007 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index.
The size of network variable includes a range of the number of "in-network" doctors who typically have lower
copays or coinsurance than "out-of-network" doctors. The count of the number of doctors includes primary care
physicians and specialists. An example of the type of network range reported in the data is "1501-2000" indicating
that the number of doctors covered lies between these values. The number of doctors in a plan is estimated to be the
average of this range (e.g. For the range 1501-2000, the size of the network variable equals (1501+2000)/2=1750.5).54
Table 1 provides a listing of variables used in the study along with a brief description of each variable:
TABLE A1. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
The full sample selected in this study includes all contracts where there is more than 10 enrollees in the contract.55
52Strombom et al (2002) show that switching costs in health plan markets may be signi￿cant. Reputation may also play an important
role. Sorenson (2006) uses employer data and ￿nds that the choice of health insurance plan is in￿uenced by coworkers￿decisions. In
interviews with large insurers Gold and Peterson (2006) report that establishing a new network may be costly and time consuming
because it takes on-the-ground resources to establish a new network. Town and Liu (2003) also control for the age of the contract and
￿nd it to be a signi￿cant explanatory variable.
53In 2007 the amount is adjusted to re￿ect the fact that, on average, payments are below the county benchmark because of the
implementation of the bidding system. I approximate this amount by using the MedPac (2007) reported average di⁄erence between the
benchmark rate and payments to insurers. The payment rate to insurers is, on average, 97% of the benchmark rate.
54The number of providers is observed for most plans, but about 6% of the plans appear to be missing the network size variable.
55I also exclude Programs of All-Inclusive Care for Elderly (PACE), which are combination programs with Medicaid, Health Care
30The sample is limited to the years 2004, 2005, and 2007 because OOPC data was not produced in 2006.56
10.2 First Stage Regression
The table below presents the results from the "￿rst-stage" regression of the demand estimates for Model 1 and Model
6.57
TABLE A2. FIRST STAGE REGRESSION - MODEL 1
TABLE A3. FIRST STAGE REGRESSION - MODEL 6
10.3 Discussion of Other Model Parameters
The model includes a number of additional variables as controls. The value of the contract increases with the
contract￿ s age in the county. The positive e⁄ect of the contract￿ s age on demand suggests that incumbent contracts
o⁄er signi￿cantly greater value. While the estimates imply that consumers value an incumbent￿ s presence, they do
not precisely identify why an incumbent is more highly valued. It is unclear if the increased value is attributable to
network quality, reputation, or switching costs. The estimates indicate a high value for incumbent insurers that were
in the market in 2001. The interaction between plan age and insurer age is negative, showing that the incumbent
insurer￿ s advantage declines over time.
The plan type variables such as PPO, PFFS, Req. Referral and Regional PPO capture average utility for these
di⁄erent types. A priori the expected signs of the plan type dummies are uncertain. The PPO and PFFS plans
typically o⁄er broader and less restrictive networks, but they are also relatively new to the MA markets, so potential
enrollees may be less familiar with these types of plans. The deductible and OOPC limit variables also included in
the model a⁄ect the timing of the bene￿ciary OOPC payments, which may have a di⁄erent a⁄ect on demand than
copays and coinsurance. That is, these variables may capture factors a⁄ecting the timing or risk associated with a
plan that may not be re￿ ected in the OOPC estimates. OOPC limits reduce the expenditure risk to bene￿ciaries.
The deductible must be paid before the plan provides coverage, so higher deductibles are undesirable. The expected
sign of these coe¢ cients are not entirely clear, since both the deductibles and OOPC limits are captured in the
estimation of the expected OOPC variables. While one might be concerned that OOPC limits and deductibles are
endogeneous, I ￿nd that the estimates of the model change little when these variables are excluded. Holding OOPC
constant, the estimates show that bene￿ciaries prefer contracts with lower deductibles and contracts that have some
type of cost limit. The estimates also show that contracts with a greater number of plan o⁄erings are valued more.
Prepayment Plans (HCPP) plans, which covers only outpatient services. Employer group plans are also excluded.
56SCP enrollment data was available in 2006, and is used in the construction of the age variables previously discussed.
57In addition to the minimum premium in other markets, I also examined the maximium premium and OOPC as an alternative
instrument. I obtain similar results using the maximum in replace of the minimum or using the maximum in place of the instruments
using rival prices.














































































Private FFS HMO PPO MA Rate
Table 1. 1 Summary Statistics of Contract Characteristics*
Mean sd 25th percentile Median 75 percentile
Key Plan Variables
Expected OOPC Medical Services $87.26 $30.69 $69.78 $84.21 $106.25
Expected OOPC Drugs -$44.26 $33.04 -$77.60 -$47.52 -$8.97
Premium $49.38 $56.14 $10.00 $40.00 $72.23







Has Drug Insurance 0.76
Has a Deductible 0.11
Amount of Deductible $45.51 $219.47
Has an OOPC Limit 0.66
Amount of OOPC Limit $2,343.63 $2,271.78
Contract Age in County 1.41 1.74
Insurer Age in County 1.69 1.90
# offerings 2.45 1.46
*Estimates reported in 2007 dollars.
**Average only includes network based plans that are not missing the network variable.
32Variable 2004 2007
Number of Counties 1,068 2,932
Avg. Eligible Population 28,423.18 14,615.86
Avg. Enrollment 4,744.00 2,818.15
Avg. Number of Insurers 1.09 1.58
Avg. Number of Contracts 1.80 4.95
Avg. MA Penetration 10.1% 11.2%
Table 1.2  Changes in Market Characteristics by County
Table 1.3 Changes in Contract and Market Characteristics by Contract Type*
Variable 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Plan Type Share 89.1% 52.68% 10.0% 27.0% 0.8% 20.3%
MA Reimbursement Rates $598.59 $776.39 $608.60 $740.09 $587.90 $715.55
Plan Characteristics
OOPC Medical Services $67.63 $79.82 $73.36 $78.24 $108.69 $98.38
OOPC Drugs -$33.27 -$54.55 -$25.66 -$64.32 -$31.00 -$45.04
Premium $70.89 $43.88 $71.72 $60.74 $52.88 $42.84
Total OOPC & Premium $105.25 $69.15 $119.41 $74.66 $130.57 $96.19
Network size 2.59 2.49 2.66 6.47 - -
PPO 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.71 - -
Number of Observations 1,042 1,606 526 3,351 574 8,425
*Estimates reported in 2007 dollars.
Referral No Referral Private FFS
Contract Type
33Table 2.  Demand Estimates
coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t coef t
Premium -0.0054 -4.25 -0.0047 -4.02 -0.0054 -6.52 -0.0052 -4.03 -0.0014 -1.85 -0.0054 -4.25
Expected OOPC Drugs -0.0028 -2.02 -0.0020 -0.93 -0.0019 -1.47 -0.0020 -2.21 -0.0014 -1.73 -0.0103 -3.09
Expected OOPC Medical Services -0.0085 -3.09 -0.0079 -2.89 -0.0097 -4.64 -0.0013 -0.74 -0.0018 -1.46 -0.0180 -3.86
Log(Share_j | MA product) 0.6588 9.22 0.7169 11.01 0.3432 6.19 0.5871 7.13 0.5506 6.32 0.6839 8.06
Drug Insurance -0.0438 -0.35
Req. Referral * Log(Network Size) -0.0518 -1.36 -0.0434 -1.26 -0.0551 -1.72 -0.0739 -1.63 -0.0310 -0.77 -0.0362 -0.77
Log(Network Size) 0.1105 2.97 0.0948 2.86 0.1316 5.17 0.1241 2.96 0.0832 2.15 0.1122 2.77
Req. Referral 0.1722 2.61 0.1558 2.76 0.3280 7.15 0.2562 2.92 0.2770 2.95 0.0389 0.56
Private FFS 0.0634 0.54 0.0480 0.51 -0.0582 -0.88 -0.0695 -0.55 -0.0519 -0.4 0.2709 2.09
PPO -0.1256 -1.65 -0.1036 -1.65 -0.2838 -2.71 -0.1127 -1.33 -0.0917 -1.12 -0.2384 -2.36
Regional PPO -0.1042 -0.82 -0.1055 -0.95 -0.2917 -1.73 -0.0895 -0.61 -0.0631 -0.42 -0.0620 -0.44
Has a Deductible -0.0226 -0.31 -0.0208 -0.33 -0.0435 -0.76 -0.0159 -0.19 -0.0690 -0.83 -0.0440 -0.49
Amount of Deductible -0.0002 -2.28 -0.0002 -2.42 -0.0001 -2.06 -0.0002 -1.51 -0.0001 -1.02 -0.0002 -2.06
Has an OOPC Limit 0.1522 2.1 0.1190 2.03 0.2094 4.96 0.1932 2.28 0.1903 2.24 0.1976 1.74
Amount of OOPC Limit 0.0000 0.45 0.0000 0.88 0.0000 0.3 0.0000 -0.5 0.0000 -0.54 0.0000 -0.26
# offerings 0.0613 2.65 0.0572 2.49 0.0499 5.55 0.0784 3.14 0.0656 2.63 0.0207 0.8
Log(Plan Age in County) 0.6897 5.14 0.6062 5.01 1.2213 12.61 0.7870 4.74 0.8358 5.11 0.6108 3.5
Log(Insurer Age in County) -0.0017 -0.03 0.0089 0.17 0.0498 1.65 -0.0751 -1.13 -0.0713 -1.07 0.0702 1.01
Log(Plan Age) * Log(Insurer Age) -0.1505 -3.42 -0.1474 -3.91 -0.1804 -7.98 -0.1335 -2.77 -0.1133 -2.42 -0.1857 -3.11
Plan in Market in 2001 -0.0103 -0.12 -0.0195 -0.24 0.0453 0.88 -0.0478 -0.44 -0.0210 -0.19 0.1572 1.4
Insurer  in Market in 2001 0.2877 3.24 0.2549 3.36 0.2175 4.55 0.3367 3.19 0.2161 2.29 0.2740 2.99





































































2004 $45.52 7% $3.19 $6.00 $13.22
2005 $42.31 10% $4.02 $6.53 $14.43
2007 $77.00 12% $9.24 $9.72 $21.02
*Estimates reported in 2007 dollars.
34Table 4.  Policy Experiments and Surplus Changes 2007







Benchmark Surplus Value  $21.02 Billion  $20.94 Billion
100% 100%
Market Changes
1. All premiums equal to zero 148.83% 149.75%
2. Reduce OOPC on Drugs & Medical by 50% 151.04% 264.85%
3. Increase OOPC by Setting the Minimum OOPC to 90th Percentile 73.74% 48.49%
4. Increase Premium by Set the Minimum Premium to the 90th Percentile 77.48% 77.50%
5. Take Drug Insurance Away from All 88.32% 65.80%
6. Increase OOPC by Set the Minimum OOPC for Medical to the 90th Percentile 83.34% 72.23%
7. Drop all HMO Products 59.55% 61.54%
8. Drop all PFFS Products 90.17% 90.61%
9. Drop all Local PPO Products 98.37% 98.48%












































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9)
HMO 10% 2,868 $8.50 $0.93 $7.58 $247.14 $26.92 $220.22
PFFS 19% 596 $2.07 $1.37 $0.70 $289.12 $191.65 $97.47
Local PPO 17% 114 $0.34 $0.28 $0.06 $249.51 $207.42 $42.09
35Table A1.  Description of Variables
Premium The MA premium on the contract above the part B premium.
Expected OOPC Drugs
The CMS estimated OOPC for prescription drug services only.  Negative
dollar value that is the amount of OOPC relative to no drug insurance.
Expected OOPC Medical Services
The CMS estimated OOPC for medical services (i.e. All services excluding
prescription drugs).
Has Drug Insurance An indicator that is one if drug insurance is offered and zero otherwise.
Network Size (1,000s)
The estimated number of doctors "in-network" for a contract reported in
thousands.
Log(Network Size) Log of network size in thousands=Log(Network Size).
Missing Network Variable An indicator that is one if the nework size is missing and zero otherwise.
Req. Referral
An indicator that is one if a referral is required to see a specialist and zero
otherwise.
Private FFS
An indicator that is one if the contract is a Private FFS plan and zero
otherwise.
PPO An indicator that is one if the contract is a PPO and zero otherwise.
Regional PPO
An indicator that is one if the contract is a Regional PPO and zero
otherwise.
Has a Deductible An indicator that is one if the contract has a deductible and zero otherwise.
Amount of Deductible The amount of the deductible.
Has an OOPC Limit
An idicator that is one if the contract has a spending limit where all services
above the specified limit are covered and zero otherwise.
Amount of OOPC Limit The amount of the OOPC limit.
# offerings # of plan offerings listed under the specified contract.
Contract Age in County The age of the contract in the county starting in 2001.
Insurer Age in County The age of the insurer in the county starting in 2001.
Contract in Market in 2001
An indicator that is one if contract was present in the county in 2001 and
zero otherwise.
Insurer in Market in 2001
An indicator that is one if the insurer was in the county in 2001 and zero
otherwise.
MA Rate Rate paid to insurers (Benchmark Rate in 2007).
Table A2.  First Stage Regression - Model 1
coef t coef t coef t coef t
Avg Premium Rivals - Other Markets -0.1383 -0.94 -0.0797 -1.14 0.1092 1.47 -0.0006 -0.23
Avg OOPC Medical Rivals - Other Markets 0.1562 1.24 -0.1694 -1.59 -0.1786 -3.14 0.0045 1.43
Avg OOPC Drugs Rivals - Other Markets 0.3177 1.55 -1.2129 -7.14 0.0658 0.54 0.0107 2.71
Min Premium - Other Markets 0.4806 9.03 -0.0577 -1.29 -0.0466 -1.81 -0.0043 -3.07
Min OOPC Medical - Other Markets -0.0531 -0.73 0.0948 2.17 0.1558 6.37 -0.0004 -0.31
Min OOPC Drugs - Other Markets -0.0030 -0.05 0.2584 4.04 0.0623 1.97 -0.0032 -1.76
Avg  log(Network Size Rival) -1.8538 -0.75 -4.7669 -2.77 1.9117 2.13 -0.1631 -2.74
Avg MA Rate - Other Markets -0.0957 -1.85 -0.0176 -1.12 -0.0108 -0.67 0.0011 1.51
Avg. log(Age Rival Plan+1) 2.5043 1.63 -0.5481 -0.5 0.0697 0.08 -0.0076 -0.14
Avg. log(Age Rival Chain+1) -1.7083 -1.26 0.2434 0.25 -0.2686 -0.36 -0.0083 -0.19
Minimum log(Age Rival Plan+1) 0.5844 0.2 -3.0922 -1.6 2.1941 1.23 -0.2482 -3.37
Number of Observations
Premium OOPC Drugs OOPC Medical Log(share of MA)
11,991 11,991
Note:  Other independent variables include all of the independent variables included in Table 3 and also a dummy variable indicating whether the contract is only
observed in a single market and is missing other market variables.
11,991 11,991
36Table A3. First Stage Regression - Model 6
coef t coef t coef t coef t
Lagged Premium 0.5600 12.19 -0.0396 -1.42 -0.0543 -2.57 -0.0044 -5.27
Lagged Offers Drug Insurance -9.9611 -2.09 0.5560 0.13 0.1463 0.04 0.4679 2.75
Lagged OOPC Drug -0.0477 -0.61 0.2479 3.95 -0.0097 -0.26 -0.0067 -4.51
Lagged OOPC Medical -0.2854 -3.69 -0.0811 -1.72 0.3193 6.6 -0.0063 -4.92
Missing Lagged Value 1.8616 0.23 -7.3871 -0.82 29.8823 7.27 -0.8418 -4.1
Avg  log(Network Size Rival) -2.9422 -1.2 -3.7820 -1.64 2.3273 2.27 -0.1614 -3.17
Avg MA Rate - Other Markets -0.0893 -1.9 0.0097 0.52 -0.0103 -0.72 0.0006 0.92
Avg. log(Age Rival Plan+1) 2.2574 1.54 2.2511 2.41 0.5293 0.64 -0.0662 -1.17
Avg. log(Age Rival Chain+1) -1.7186 -1.33 -2.0845 -2.57 -0.7558 -1.02 0.0431 0.99
Minimum log(Age Rival Plan+1) -0.6487 -0.26 -1.8233 -0.91 1.3572 1.07 -0.2311 -3.36
Number of Observations
Premium OOPC Drugs OOPC Medical Log(share of MA)
Note:  Other independent variables include all of the independent variables included in Table 3 and also a dummy variable indicating
whether the contract is only observed in a single market and is missing other market variables.
11,991 11,991 11,991 11,991
37